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TO COMMUNICATION 
Garth E. Flygare* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A subcontractor was involved in a construction project, renovating a 
series of restrooms for a school district.1  Things were not exactly going 
according to plan, and the architect’s project manager was unsatisfied with 
some of the work.  The subcontractor was involved in the application of a 
high performance paint coating, and its speckled color was slightly different 
from the manufacturer’s sample. 
The architect’s project manager stated in a written evaluation that 
changes were necessary to correct the problems, but what she did not realize 
was that the expense involved in the process of preparing the surface and 
reapplying the coating would be substantial.  The particular coating system 
was only produced in limited production runs, and this only occurred when 
the individual orders were in sufficient numbers to warrant the production.  
The subcontractor knew at that time that if he did the requested additional 
work his business would lose quite a bit of money and that the specific color 
concern would be unlikely to improve.  On the other hand, if he refused to 
do the work, he would not have fulfilled his responsibilities under the 
contract. 
Burdened with what seemed like a lose-lose situation, the subcontractor 
went to the general contractor’s office and spoke with the project manager 
about the concerns of the architect’s project manager.  The subcontractor 
explained the situation and his difficult position.  The subcontractor did not 
know what to do.  He did not want to lose money, and he did not want to 
cause any problems that might affect his relationship with the general 
contractor.  He had already worked as a subcontractor successfully with that 
company on several other projects, and their relationship was relatively solid.  
He told the general contractor about all of his concerns, including the 
financial aspects, the production issues, and the marginal improvement 
potential of the additional work. 
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1. The events in this example are based on a true account of the author’s experience. 
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However, the conversation took an interesting turn at one point, when 
the general contractor’s project manager paused and plainly asked the 
subcontractor, “Are you saying you cannot fulfill your end of the contract?”  
When he asked that question the subcontractor paused as well, because it 
seemed like the entire tone of the conversation had changed.  He answered 
him, “No, I just wanted a little help.” 
Following that conversation, a meeting took place on location at the 
project site, and together the parties worked out their issues.  The architect’s 
project manager clarified her concerns that were, in actuality, limited to a few 
specific areas of the renovation as opposed to the entire coating system as 
indicated on the previous written notice.  The additional work was possible 
with the remaining product that the subcontractor had on location, and it was 
limited in scope, so that any additional labor cost was minimized as well. 
What the subcontractor did not know at the time is that this was his very 
first introduction to the concept of anticipatory repudiation.  He was not 
inexperienced with contracts at that time, and he was attempting to work with 
the other relevant parties in good faith.  He had a good relationship with both 
the architectural firm and the general contractor.  He was trying to 
communicate with all parties in order to work out a solution to a problem.  It 
was his assumption that each party had a specific concern, and each other 
party was probably not fully aware of the concerns of everyone else. 
The consequences for his ignorance regarding anticipatory repudiation 
could have been extreme.  If he had misspoken or made a regrettable 
statement in the context of a heated discussion, the entire situation could have 
turned on its head.  He could have been punished for what was originally 
intended to be an open attempt at communication to solve a problem. 
Although the above business interaction is not directly covered by 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), as it is not related to 
the sale of goods,2 the account above serves as a good example of the kinds 
of problems that can arise when dealing with the concept of anticipatory 
repudiation under the U.C.C.  The account above ended with a mutually 
beneficial conclusion, but that outcome was the product of communication 
and working together.  Without the established relationship and the 
motivation to communicate and succeed, the events could have easily taken 
a turn for the worse.3 
The formulation of anticipatory repudiation under the U.C.C. stands as 
a disincentive to communication between parties when future performance is 
called into question.  In order to fully understand anticipatory repudiation, 
this Comment will review the history of anticipatory repudiation, and it will 
discuss how anticipatory repudiation is set up under the framework of the 
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U.C.C.  This Comment will also discuss how the U.C.C. discourages 
communications when a party faces difficulty or uncertainty regarding that 
party’s ability to perform, and how a non-repudiating party faces a similar 
disincentive when the other party repudiates an obligation under an 
agreement.  Finally, this Comment will address why the barrier to 
communication, caused by anticipatory repudiation, is contrary to optimum 
business interactions. 
 II.  BACKGROUND  
The history and framework of anticipatory repudiation under the U.C.C. 
are necessary to understand the importance of the concept in present day 
contract law.  The specific examples of how courts have applied anticipatory 
repudiation are also instructive as a guideline for the expectations of 
businesses operating under the U.C.C. 
A.  The History of Anticipatory Repudiation 
Anticipatory repudiation is the term associated with the occurrence 
when one party refuses to honor its obligations under a contract prior to the 
time at which performance is due.4  It has an extensive history both in the 
common law, and, as it evolved and reached a point of codification, among 
the laws of the several states and internationally.5 
As early as the 1700’s, the concept of anticipatory repudiation was 
found in British courts.6  By the middle of the 1800’s it was found in 
American courts as well, and American scholars had already given the 
concept recognition in legal writing.7  Although early treatment focused more 
intently on situations in which the breaching party made actions inconsistent 
with the continued ability to perform under a contract, the idea was clearly 
recognized, nonetheless.8  By 1916, the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation 
had even reached the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court held, in Central 
Trust Co. of Illinois v. Chicago Auditorium Ass’n, that the doctrine of 
anticipatory repudiation was already well-established.9 
 In 1932, anticipatory repudiation was included in the first Restatement 
of Contracts.10  It was later included in the U.C.C., and eventually the 
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts included it as well, along with the changes 
that arose in the U.C.C.11  This doctrine even achieved international 
recognition when it was adopted in 1987 as part of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.12 
B.  The Anticipatory Repudiation Framework Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. provides a non-repudiating party a few options 
when the other party repudiates an obligation under a contract before the 
repudiating party’s performance is due.13  Under section 2-610 of the U.C.C., 
when a party repudiates, the other party can: 
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the 
repudiating party; or  
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (section 2-703 or section 2-711), even 
though he has notified the repudiating party that he would await the latter’s 
performance and has urged retraction; and  
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article on the seller’s right to identify goods to 
the contract notwithstanding breach or to salvage unfinished goods (section 
2-704).14 
In addition to either waiting for performance or resorting to remedies, a non-
repudiating party has another option.15  Under section 2-609 of the U.C.C., a 
party has the option of requesting adequate assurances of performance from 
the other party if there are reasonable grounds to question the other party’s 
future performance.16  If the other party does not provide adequate assurances 
within a reasonable time, not exceeding thirty days, then that failure to 
provide assurance constitutes a breach.17  The purpose of this section is to 
maintain the sense of security that should be inherent in any contract, that 
each party will dutifully perform his obligations when due.18 
Where section 2-609 speaks to the uncertainty of performance, section 
2-610 refers to situations in which an overt communication or action takes 
place, which reasonably indicates that performance will not occur.19  
Basically, there are three distinct situations that these two sections identify as 
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possibly constituting a repudiation.  The first is when a party makes an overt 
communication that indicates future non-performance.20  The second is when 
a party takes an action which reasonably indicates that future performance 
will not occur.21  The final situation is when a party fails to give adequate 
assurances in a reasonable amount of time after reasonable grounds for 
questioning future performance manifest, and such a request is made.22 
Both sections provide an option for the non-repudiating party; the 
language indicates that the non-repudiating party “may” do the certain 
specific options provided.23  Nothing in these sections is mandatory for the 
non-repudiating party. 
It should be noted, however, that section 2-611 does provide the ability 
to retract a repudiation by the repudiating party.24  Such a retraction must be 
made prior to the time when performance is due and before the non-
repudiating party has materially changed its position.25  Such a retraction 
excuses any consequences of the non-repudiating party’s suspended 
performance as well.26 
Additionally, the ability of the repudiating party to retract its 
repudiation is completely dependent on the actions taken by the non-
repudiating party.27  For example, if the non-repudiating party has canceled 
the contract or acquired substitute performance elsewhere, then the 
repudiating party has no right to retract its repudiation, regardless of the 
relative extent of time between the moment that such retraction is given and 
the time at which performance is due.28  In effect, what appears to be an 
option on the part of the repudiating party is instead subject to the option of 
the non-repudiating party.29 
C.  Examples of Repudiation and the Secret Intent to Repudiate 
Knowing the framework within which this concept operates is 
important to perform a proper analysis, but another element that should be 
examined is when the applicability of anticipatory repudiation has been 
recognized.  The U.C.C. does not specifically define circumstances 
constituting anticipatory repudiation.30  Instead, case law provides a guide to 
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instances that qualify as anticipatory repudiation, as well as those instances 
that do not.31 
In determining whether the specific actions of a party constitute 
anticipatory repudiation, a court can follow the U.C.C. framework detailed 
above,32 understanding that a “[r]epudiation can take the form of an action 
that ‘reasonably indicates’ that the party will not perform its contractual 
obligation.”33  There are numerous examples of anticipatory repudiation that 
extend beyond the simple, overt statement of one party, indicating that it will 
not perform future obligations.   
Conditioning one party’s future performance on the addition of 
obligations to another party also qualifies as anticipatory repudiation.34  In 
other words, when a party to an agreement refuses to perform unless a new 
or modified agreement is formed, the party is stating that it will not perform 
under the current agreement.  Whether a separate agreement manifests in the 
future is irrelevant.  What is important here is how that party is treating the 
current contract. 
It is possible, however, for a party to request modifications to an 
existing agreement without conditioning that party’s future performance on 
the manifestation of such modifications.35  “Neither an attitude that suggests 
more negotiations are sought nor requests to change the terms of a contract 
are enough to constitute repudiation.”36  What this speaks to is the intention 
of non-performance, and the communication of that intention.37  A simple 
request to modify an agreement is a communication of unhappiness, but not 
of unwillingness.38 
An example of this type of request, and how it can cause confusion, can 
be found in Tenavision, Inc. v. Neuman.39  In Tenavision, a nursing home 
interpreted a request for particular forms from a television supplier, the 
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delivery of which was not in the original agreement, to be an indication of 
that supplier’s anticipatory repudiation of the contract.40  However, the 
supplier did not condition any performance on compliance with the request.41  
The nursing home suspended performance after this communication.42  The 
court held that, because the supplier’s communication did not qualify as a 
repudiation, the nursing home’s suspension of performance was actually a 
repudiation in itself.43 
The situation in Tenavision sheds light on the fact that a communication, 
mistaken as an intention of non-performance, can result in an aggrieved party 
suspending performance and seeking damages.  This behavior based on a 
mistake is, in itself, an anticipatory repudiation of the contract, which means 
that the party originally fearing non-performance could owe damages to the 
other party. 
Another form of mistake should be noted as well.  If a communication 
of non-performance takes place, and it is based off of a misunderstanding 
concerning a term in the contract or a mistake, ambiguity, or incompleteness 
in the contract, that communication does not constitute an anticipatory 
repudiation.44  Instead, the parties must cure the defect in the agreement.45  
As long as any renegotiations are done in good faith to cure the problem, the 
communication should not be construed as repudiation of the contract.46 
An additional situation that deserves special attention is once again 
related to whether there exists an intention of non-performance, and whether 
there is a communication of such an intention.  In Unique Systems, Inc. v. 
Zotos International, Inc., the court held that “[a] secret intention not to 
perform or a negative attitude does not rise to the level of repudiation.”47  
Without a communication or meaningful action relaying the intentions of the 
repudiating party, there is no anticipatory repudiation.48  This case is 
important, because it identifies the necessity of the second fundamental 
requirement, the communication.  Where the focus is usually on the nature 
of the content in a communication, Unique Systems speaks to those situations 
in which the intent may be clear, but the communication of the intent is not. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Anticipatory repudiation is a helpful tool for a contracting party when 
that party is facing a clear intention of non-performance from the other party.  
It helps the non-repudiating party avoid impending damages, and, in doing 
so, it mitigates future damages that will be caused by an almost certain breach 
of the contract.  Anticipatory repudiation falls short when it stands as a barrier 
to healthy communication between contracting parties.  Healthy 
communication is important to business relationships, and, by standing as a 
barrier, anticipatory repudiation causes businesses to make choices according 
to an artificial prioritization that primarily considers contracts on a 
transaction-to-transaction basis, while ignoring valuable business 
relationships. 
A.  One-Sided Protection 
If a situation arises that causes insecurity on the part of one party that a 
repudiation exists or will shortly occur, section 2-609 of the U.C.C. offers the 
insecure party the option to take action.49  Once a party makes a clear 
communication of repudiation or fails to provide requested adequate 
assurances to the other party of an agreement, anticipatory repudiation under 
the U.C.C. offers the non-repudiating party the option to take action.50 
These options are one-sided.  The non-repudiating party has the right to 
invoke protections, while the repudiating party does not.51  It might seem at 
first that the repudiating party has full control over whether or not to make a 
repudiating communication.  The repudiating party similarly seems to have 
full control over whether to provide adequate assurances when requested.  
When analyzing the framework of the U.C.C., the options available to each 
party are relatively evident, but in practice the situation is less clear. 
When requesting adequate assurances, there is no specific language an 
insecure party must incorporate into the written request.52  Additionally, the 
insecure party may suspend performance, but it does not need to relay any 
information relating to the suspension to the repudiating party.53  
Additionally, the insecure party’s continued performance, by accepting 
improper deliveries, does not constitute any acceptance of the current state 
of the contract dealings.54 
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These requirements indicate that the party whose future performance is 
in question may not know of the gravity of the situation.  Without a 
communication of the consequences of a failure to provide adequate 
assurances, the alleged repudiating party could perceive the request for 
adequate assurances as a request for the performance of an obligation outside 
the scope of the original agreement. 
Knowing that the request for adequate assurances is originating under 
section 2-609 of the U.C.C., the party subject to such a request would be on 
notice of the consequences of a failure to respond or would at least know the 
basis for the request, and that party could make an informed response.  
Without such notice, section 2-609 only provides a one-sided protection to 
the requesting party. 
Combining this with the fact that the insecure party can choose to 
continue receiving improper deliveries and suspend performance secretly 
until that party receives assurances, the alleged repudiating party has no 
standard by which to measure the true position of the insecure party.55  If a 
party cannot look to the writings and actions of another party to evaluate its 
position in relation to that party, it cannot form a basis upon which to make 
any determinations that would affect that relationship. 
Knowing that the insecure party views the situation in such a serious 
light is an important factor in the decision to provide adequate assurances.  
Knowing that the insecure party has suspended performance until the alleged 
repudiating party provides assurances is even more relevant in the decision.  
Without this information and without a requirement to provide it, the alleged 
repudiating party has no protection while the insecure party does. 
When it comes to circumstances where a party has perceived an overt 
communication of an intention of non-performance or when the alleged 
repudiating party has failed to provide adequate assurances, a similar 
situation arises, in which the repudiating party may not be on notice of the 
non-repudiating party’s perception.  Although section 2-611 provides a 
repudiating party the opportunity to retract its repudiation,56 there is no 
requirement for the non-repudiating party to notify the repudiating party that 
it perceives circumstances which constitute a repudiation of obligations 
under the agreement.57 
The non-repudiating party has the option to encourage a retraction of 
the repudiation and assure the repudiating party that it will await 
performance, but, even in the case that the non-repudiating party provides 
such encouragement and assurance, it may secretly pursue remedies for a 
breach.58  This means a non-repudiating party can calm the concerns of the 
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57.  See id.  
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repudiating party and effectively indicate that the repudiating party has until 
the time when performance is due to retract its repudiation, while at the same 
time the non-repudiating party actually reserves the right to seek remedies at 
any time prior to the time when performance is due.59 
The U.C.C. protects the non-repudiating party by allowing it to reserve 
the right to seek remedies.  However, it effectively allows the non-repudiating 
party to preserve its right to seek remedies through a communication that 
may or may not be provided in actual good faith.60  A statement indicating 
that the non-repudiating party will await performance is inherently designed 
to create an expectation in the repudiating party.  However, allowing the non-
repudiating party to seek remedies, while providing the repudiating party 
with an expectation that the non-repudiating party intends to await 
performance, creates a situation of uncertainty. 
Once again, the repudiating party is in a position where it cannot look 
to the actions or communications of the non-repudiating party in order to 
establish some level of expectation after the non-repudiating party perceives 
a repudiation.  There is not a notice requirement when the non-repudiating 
party perceives a repudiation,61 and the optional notice available under the 
provisions does not carry an obligation to adhere to whatever statements the 
non-repudiating party chooses to make.62  The repudiating party does not 
have a standard by which to measure its position in relation to the non-
repudiating party, and, while the U.C.C. provides protection to the non-
repudiating party,63 it provides none here to the repudiating party64 and 
effectively nullifies the ability to retract the repudiation. 
Both in the instance of a request for adequate assurances and in the 
instance of a perceived repudiation prior to the time at which performance is 
due, the insecure or non-repudiating party receives a one-sided protection, 
and the repudiating party (or the alleged repudiating party) is effectively 
without protection. 
B.  Disincentive to Communication 
Anticipatory repudiation is a disincentive to communication for both 
parties to an agreement.  The party whose performance may be in question 
could potentially lose benefits under the agreement if the other party 
interprets a communication as a repudiation, while the insecure or aggrieved 
                                                                                                                 
59.  Id.  
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party could lose its ability to seek remedies under the U.C.C. if its 
communication compels the repudiating party to retract its position. 
1.  Disincentive for the Repudiating Party to Communicate 
When faced with a situation that would make performance of a future 
obligation under an agreement difficult, a party to that agreement has a 
decision to make.  That party needs to determine whether to notify the other 
party of the difficulty or to withhold the information and deal with the 
difficulties as they arise.  In order to make this determination, a review of the 
party’s consequences in either situation is necessary. 
The first option to review is that which involves communicating the 
potential difficulty to the other party.  There are positive outcomes that could 
result from a communication with the other party.  First, the other party could 
receive the information as a beneficial, good-faith demonstration of the 
party’s intention to work with the other party through any difficulties that 
might arise.  Then, the two parties could work together to identify a solution, 
or, perhaps, the parties could renegotiate an alternative agreement in good 
faith.  This positive result could be expected from situations involving parties 
with established relationships or those interested in fostering such 
relationships. 
The alternative result could carry negative consequences.  If the other 
party interprets the communication of impending difficulties regarding the 
future performance of the potentially breaching party as a repudiation of 
those obligations, then that party can seek remedies under section 2-610 of 
the U.C.C.65  As discussed in the previous section, the party communicating 
the potential difficulties would effectively invest certain rights in the other 
party while subjecting itself to a state of insecurity.  Because of the lack of a 
notice requirement when a party perceives a repudiation from the other party, 
a party facing difficulties also takes the chance of giving the wrong 
impression to the other party, and, if it does so, it may never know of this 
interpretation until after the other party has sought remedies. 
Although a court will subject a communication of repudiation to 
scrutiny and the non-repudiating party will not always prevail, the severity 
of the consequences of a misinterpreted communication are quite extreme.  
While on one hand the result of a communication could be a mutually 
beneficial interaction, on the other hand the communication might lead to an 
obligation to compensate the other party for a breach of contract.  Thus, 
communicating the information is a gamble. 
When this information is combined with the holding in Unique Systems, 
Inc. v. Zotos International, Inc., the decision to withhold communications is 
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more easily determined.66  As discussed earlier, “[a] secret intention not to 
perform or a negative attitude does not rise to the level of repudiation.”67  
Additionally, there is no duty to relay information about potential non-
performance.68  The fact that this secret intention of non-performance is 
protected, while a communication is not protected, clearly indicates that the 
interests of a party facing performance difficulties are better served if that 
party chooses to withhold that information from the other party. 
At least in terms of provisions contained in the U.C.C., there is no 
incentive for a repudiating party to communicate the intention to repudiate.  
There is not even an incentive to communicate a potential difficulty.  While 
there may be an incentive outside of the U.C.C. to communicate such 
information, inside the U.C.C. there is none. 
2.  Disincentive for the Non-Repudiating Party to Communicate 
When it comes to the non-repudiating or insecure party, a similar 
disincentive exists, and an incentive for communicating misleading 
information manifests as well.  While a non-repudiating party does not 
expose itself to the same vulnerabilities that a repudiating party does when it 
communicates a state of affairs to the other party, the non-repudiating party 
can compromise some rights that perceiving a repudiation may have granted. 
As described previously, the anticipatory repudiation framework 
provides a one-sided protection when the other party communicates a 
repudiation or when there are sufficient conditions to reasonably create 
insecurity in regard to the future performance of the other party.  When an 
insecurity manifests, the insecure party has a right to request adequate 
assurances.69  A failure to respond appropriately, by the party of whom 
adequate assurances are requested, can result in a repudiation.70  This 
repudiation creates a right in the insecure party to seek remedies.71  The 
perception of the other party’s intent to repudiate through the communication 
of such an intent to the non-repudiating party creates the same right as well.72 
The non-repudiating party’s disincentive to communicate exists in the 
knowledge that certain communications can destroy the rights created in this 
framework.  There is no notice requirement for the non-repudiating party 
under the U.C.C.,73 and, because of this, the non-repudiating party can 
calculate the timeliness and content of any communications. 
                                                                                                                 
66.  See 622 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1980). 
67. Id. at 377 (applying Minnesota law) (citing Teeman v. Jurek, 251 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1977)). 
68.  See U.C.C. § 2-610. 
69.  Id. § 2-609(1). 
70.  Id. § 2-609(4). 
71.  Id. § 2-610(b). 
72.  Id.  
73.  See id. § 2-610. 
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Section 2-611(1) states that a party can retract a repudiation any time 
before performance is due as long as the non-repudiating party has not 
canceled the contract or materially changed its position.74  To effectively take 
advantage of this provision, a non-repudiating party can calculate any 
communications of notice that remedies will be sought to take place after the 
non-repudiating party’s position has materially changed.  If the non-
repudiating party makes a communication prior to this time, and the 
repudiating party has an opportunity to retract its repudiation, then the non-
repudiating party will lose its right to seek remedies.75 
Similarly, the non-repudiating or insecure party can calculate the 
content of its communications, if it chooses to communicate, so as to prevent 
disclosure of its intentions to seek remedies.  For example, when an insecure 
party requests adequate assurances, it can do so in a way that does not 
disclose any intentions to seek remedies upon a failure by the other party to 
provide the requested assurances.  Doing otherwise could compel the party 
whose performance is in question to provide false assurances, destroying the 
rights of the insecure party to seek remedies. 
A non-repudiating party can also calculate its communication to include 
an intention to await performance from the repudiating party until the time at 
which the performance is due.76  By doing this, the non-repudiating party can 
discourage retractions of a repudiation, while maintaining its own rights to 
seek remedies at any time prior to the time when the other party’s 
performance of its obligations under the agreement is due.77 
Although these are communications, they are not the healthy 
communications that could positively affect the relationship between the 
parties and lead to the mutual benefit originally contemplated in the 
agreement.  This type of calculated communication is fundamentally the 
same as the absence of meaningful communications between parties.  When 
the communication of strategic or misleading information manifests in a 
contractual relationship, the results are effectively the same as the destruction 
of communication channels. 
3.  Suggestions for Overcoming the Disincentive to Communication 
After identifying some of the problems that might negatively influence 
communication between the parties of a contract, it seems appropriate to 
review some of the past recommendations for changes to the U.C.C.  In 1991, 
a task force of the A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk 
Transfers, and Documents of Title, of the Committee on the Uniform 
                                                                                                                 
74.  Id. § 2-611(1). 
75.  Id. § 2-611(3). 
76.  Id. § 2-610(b). 
77.  Id. 
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Commercial Code, prepared a study of potential changes to the provisions of 
article 2, part 6 of the U.C.C.78  The task force reviewed recommendations 
prepared by a study committee and provided feedback and potential 
amendments to the language of the official text.79 
The study committee identified the importance of the “adequate 
assurances” provision in section 2-609 and praised the section's facilitation 
of dispute resolution.80  The task force, however, recommended the 
allowance of oral requests (as opposed to only written requests) for adequate 
assurances and a definition as to what constitutes “adequate assurances.”81 
In regard to section 2-610, the study committee recommended various 
minor changes for clarity but specifically encouraged a higher standard when 
interpreting a communication to constitute a repudiation of future 
performance.82  In the implementation of this change, the study committee 
predicted that the adequate assurances of section 2-609 would be invoked 
more commonly.83  The study committee also recommended a clarification 
as to what actions, if any, the non-repudiating party could take that would be 
inconsistent with a repudiation.84  However, the task force failed to respond 
to these recommendations, and it failed to offer any other 
recommendations.85 
The study committee seems to have been on the right track to a certain 
degree on both provisions, and the failure of the task force to adopt the 
recommendations is questionable.  While the study committee failed to 
address issues in section 2-609 about adequate assurances, it identified a 
potential method to encourage the use of the adequate assurances provision 
found in section 2-609 by increasing the standard necessary for the 
identification of a repudiation under section 2-610.86  If the non-repudiating 
party has a harder time proving that the communication made by the other 
party was actually a repudiation, then it would need to verify it through the 
use of the adequate assurances provision of section 2-609. 
Where the study committee’s determinations fall short is in how it 
sought to encourage the use of the adequate assurances provision in section 
2-609 by making it more appealing.  If the use of the adequate assurances 
provision is in fact a better way to ensure that communications are actually 
                                                                                                                 
78.  Task Force of the A.B.A. Subcomm. on Gen. Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, & Documents of 
Title, Comm. on the U.C.C., Article 2, Part 6:  Breach, Repudiation and Excuse, 16 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 1157, 1157 (1991). 
79.  Id. at 1203 n.1. 
80.  Id. at 1169–70. 
81.  Id. at 1170–71. 
82.  Id. at 1171–72. 
83.  Id. at 1171. 
84. Id. at 1172. 
85. Id. at 1173. 
86. Id. at 1171–72. 
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intentions of repudiation, then a mandatory request for adequate assurances 
would sufficiently attain the same goal.  It would also accomplish this goal 
without the uncertainty presently found in section 2-610.87 
The task force’s recommendation for a definition of adequate 
assurances is helpful as well,88 but such an amendment should be 
accompanied by a requirement that specific language is to be included in each 
request for adequate assurances.  This language should include both the 
consequences for a failure to provide adequate assurances and a specific 
citation to the applicable provisions of the U.C.C.  In this way, the obligations 
of both parties in regard to necessary and sufficient communications would 
not be in question. 
A summary of these recommendations for change urged by this 
Comment are as follows:  First, when an insecurity or potential 
communication of repudiation manifests within a contractual agreement, the 
insecure, non-repudiating party must request adequate assurances.  This 
request for adequate assurances must include a notice of the consequences 
for failure to reply and a reference to sections 2-609, 2-610, and 2-611 of the 
U.C.C.  Then, the party whose performance is in question must respond 
within the specific time frame, and that response must include adequate 
assurances as defined under section 2-609 of the U.C.C. 
These changes would remove the disincentive to communicate under 
the anticipatory repudiation provisions.  The repudiating party would not face 
the uncertainty as it does currently.  If a statement is made that the non-
repudiating party interprets as constituting a repudiation, then the non-
repudiating party could no longer seek remedies without providing notice.  
The non-repudiating party would first need to request adequate assurances, 
and in this stage any misinterpretations could be corrected.  In this way, the 
repudiating party would be able to base its actions on defined expectations, 
and it would not fear adverse actions as the result of a good-faith 
communication regarding a difficulty in performance. 
Similarly, the non-repudiating party would no longer have the ability or 
incentive to strategically calculate its own communications.  Upon the 
manifestation of any uncertainty, the non-repudiating party's communication 
would be required, and its content would be predefined.  No additional rights 
would be created for the non-repudiating party until the result of the request 
for adequate assurances determined such rights. 
  
                                                                                                                 
87. Id. at 1171. 
88. Id. 
100 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 39 
 
C.  The Importance of Communication in Working Relationships 
A consequence of the incentive structure found in any statutory 
framework is the effect that it has on how different entities interact.  As 
identified above, the anticipatory repudiation framework, as it now stands, 
disincentivizes communication between parties to a contract when a problem 
arises that could stand in the way of performance.  The basic implication of 
this effect on business relationships is easily perceived, but, over the last few 
decades, the importance of communication, and its effect on business 
relationships specifically, has moved to the forefront of contemporary 
marketing research.89  The focus on business relationships in marketing has 
been termed as “relationship marketing.”90 
The recognition of relationship marketing led to the differentiation of 
transactional exchange and relational exchange.91  Where transactional 
exchange focuses on the short-term exchange, without any notion of 
commitment beyond the single transaction, relational exchange involves 
“long-term commitments . . .  and the desire for collaboration.”92  The 
perceived benefits of relationship marketing “include less need to advertise 
to attract new customers, higher levels of repeat purchases, and stability of 
income flow.”93  The products of these efforts to establish relationships 
among business partners have been termed as relational assets.94  As a result, 
some of the most valuable assets that a company possesses are difficult to 
quantify, as they include the relationships with customers and suppliers.95 
In recent years, the concepts of both relational exchange and 
transactional exchange have been identified as non-exclusive concepts, but 
the transactional exchange is basically the starting point and the relational 
exchange is the added value that results when a company tries to appeal to 
the needs of its relational assets.96  Simply put, the more a company tries to 
appeal to the needs of its customers and suppliers in their interactions, the 
more valuable those interactions become. 
                                                                                                                 
89. See Roger Bennett, Relationship Formation and Governance in Consumer Markets:  Transactional 
Analysis Versus the Behaviourist Approach, 12 J. MARKETING MGMT. 417 (1996). 
90. Id. 
91. Aurélia Lefaix-Durand & Robert Kozak, Integrating Transactional and Relational Exchange into 
the Study of Exchange Orientation in Customer Relationships, 25 J. MARKETING MGMT. 1003, 1004 
(2009). 
92.  Jagdish N. Sheth & Reshma H. Shah, Till Death Do Us Part . . . but Not Always:  Six Antecedents 
to a Customer’s Relational Preference in Buyer-Seller Exchanges, 32 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT. 
627, 628 (2003). 
93.  Bennett, supra note 89, at 418. 
94.  See Robert F. Lusch, James R. Brown & Matthew O'Brien, Protecting Relational Assets:  A Pre 
and Post Field Study of a Horizontal Business Combination, 39 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 175 
(2011). 
95.  Id. at 191. 
96.  Lefaix-Durand & Kozak, supra note 91, at 1006. 
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When applying notions of exchange orientation to interactions, it is 
possible to break down exchanges into several factors that are important to 
the development of relational assets.97  These factors are proximity,98 
interdependence,99 time orientation,100 commitment,101 communication,102 
cooperation,103 trust,104 regulation,105 coordination,106 and structure.107  The 
more that one of these factors is focused on by a company, the more that 
company is oriented toward relational exchanges.108 
In other words, if a company focuses on the factors that promote the 
value of its relational assets, it has adopted a strategy of fostering relational 
assets, and those assets will grow in value.  However, when some of the 
factors are overlooked or inappropriately focused on, the orientation of the 
company can become misaligned.109  For example, if a company strives to 
foster relationships, but it does not take into consideration the concept of 
trust, it cannot hope to realize the full extent of the fruits of its efforts 
regarding the other factors.  The concept is very similar to the “weakest link” 
                                                                                                                 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 1007 (defining proximity as applying to the closeness that firms experience both spatially and 
culturally;  the more that a firm caters to a relational asset in terms of proximity, the greater the 
added value). 
99. Id. (defining interdependence as emerging between firms as time goes by and repeated exchanges 
take place; along with repeated exchanges, irreplaceability of a trade partner increases 
interdependence, and the more interdependence grows between relational assets, the greater the 
added value).   
100.  Id. (defining time orientation as a determination of how much a company positions itself to establish 
long-term relationships with its business partners; the more a company focuses on long-term 
interactions with a relational asset, the greater the added value). 
101. Id. at 1007–08 (defining commitment as involving notions of putting the customer first and taking 
short-term losses when the alternative is sacrificing customer satisfaction; the more a company 
focuses on commitment, the greater the added value). 
102. Id. at 1008 (defining communication as the sharing of information that is frequent, reliable, relevant, 
and timely; the more a company focuses on efforts to promote the sharing of information, the greater 
the added value). 
103. Id. (defining cooperation as the voluntary undertaking of actions to achieve similar or 
complimentary goals to those of a trade partner; the more a company focuses on undertaking similar 
goals to those of a trade  partner, the greater the added value). 
104. Id.(defining trust as the perceived ability to rely on a trade partner; this stems from a number of 
other factors, including the values of the company, predictability, and competence; the more a 
company focuses on a reputation that instills trust, the greater the added value in its transactions 
with those business relationships). 
105. Id. at 1008–09 (defining regulation as dealing with the attitudes of a company relating to how it 
encourages actions in those around it; the more coercive the company, the less likely a trade partner 
is to respond well; the less coercive and more informal, the greater the added value). 
106. Id. at 1009 (defining coordination as a measure of how integrated trade partners are; if technological 
integration makes transactional interactions less complicated, then there is a greater value added to 
transactions with that relational asset). 
107. Id. at 1009–10 (defining structure as the idea that firms exist and operate within a network of other 
firms, which are all interconnected; existing within the same strong network as a relational asset 
improves the value of that relationship). 
108. Id. at 1006–07. 
109. Id. at 1017. 
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analogy.  A company’s exchange orientation is relationship-oriented only to 
the extent of its focus on the least prioritized factor. 
In regard to the present discussion regarding anticipatory repudiation, 
there are two specific consequences identified as a result of interactions under 
the current U.C.C. framework.  The first is a disincentive to communicate, 
while the second is the breach of a contract.  A failure to communicate 
obviously speaks to the communication factor of exchange orientation, while 
a breach of contract relates to trust and possibly commitment.  Additionally, 
a request for adequate assurances falls under the regulation factor, as the 
request is a legal compulsory tool, which is designed and utilized to elicit an 
action on the part of a trade partner. 
In the absence of anticipatory repudiation, the worst case scenario 
regarding relational assets is a degradation of the trust and commitment 
factors, and a breach of contract is the worst-case scenario as a result of the 
interaction.  When anticipatory repudiation becomes a factor, then there are 
further concerns.  The degradation of the trust and commitment factors 
remain, but additional factors suffer as well. 
If the insecure party requests adequate assurances, it degrades the 
regulation parameter, as that party is coercing action from the potentially 
repudiating party through statutorily defined methods.  This action may not 
always harm the relationship, but, in those instances when it is abused or used 
excessively, it will. 
In any situation involving anticipatory repudiation, the communication 
factor clearly takes punishment from all sides.  As outlined above, both 
parties have a disincentive to openly communicate.  Even those 
communications that do take place are far from the open sharing of reliable 
information that enhances relationships. 
In effect, when anticipatory repudiation under the U.C.C. applies to a 
specific trade relationship, the orientation of that relationship inherently 
becomes misaligned.  Fruits of efforts to focus on relationship marketing 
cannot be fully realized due to inherent disincentives. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Anticipatory repudiation effectively provides one-sided protection to an 
insecure or non-repudiating party of a contract, while providing little or no 
protection to a party whose future performance of an obligation under a 
contract is in question.  It disincentivizes communication between trade 
partners, and it creates an artificial incentive framework in which a party 
must make decisions.  A party facing difficulty in the performance of its 
obligations can receive no benefit from a communication while anticipatory 
repudiation remains applicable.  Additionally, it can stand as a barrier to 
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relationship marketing, as its effect on the factors important to relational 
exchanges devalues relational assets. 
Despite a failure by experts in the field to promote any meaningful 
changes to anticipatory repudiation under the U.C.C., a mandatory request 
for adequate assurances would help to resolve the problems found in 
anticipatory repudiation, which is effectively a barrier to communication. 
 
